the critical facts and circumstances for the reviewing court are those which were made known to the issuing Magistrate at the time the warrant application was determined"]). Government prosecutorssaid that they intend to seek a superseding indictment on new allegations. Cases involving violations of basic rights of citizensin order to achieve a criminal enforcement action is simply wrong. As in Hansen, "no observation was reported as to any movement of persons between the house and the [vehicles]" (Hansen, 38 NY2d at 20) that would substantiate a belief that the vehicles searched were utilized in the alleged criminal activity. United States v Evans, 92 F3d 540, 543 [7th Cir 1996] ["It seems to us that a car parked in a garage is just another interior container, like a closet or a desk"]; United States v Percival, 756 F2d 600, 612 [7th Cir 1985] ["Although a car is less fixed than a closet or cabinet, . The warrant application also detailed drug sales that took place in the street in front of the premises, including a controlled buy with a confidential informant, two undercover buys, and other transactions observed during surveillance of the premises. L. Rev. In this case, by comparison, the warrant application contained no mention whatsoever of the existence of the vehicles ultimately searched, much less evidence connecting them to any criminality. at 821). In one of first impression for the Georgia Supreme Court, the issue this case presented centered on the effect of the States delay in obtaining search warrants for data contained in electronic devices when those devices were originally seized in a warrantless, but lawful, manner by police. The significance of that conclusion relates back to the basic standards for issuing and reviewing search warrants (see Nieves, 36 NY2d at 402 [ "In reviewing the validity of a search warrant . About; License; Lawyer Directory; Projects. Facing steeper political headwinds than past cycles, the executive branch is packaging the spying authority known as Section 702 as more than a counterterrorism tool. Discipline in this area benefits not only the Supreme Court in determining its own jurisdiction, but also this Court in establishing a respected body of state constitutional law. Defense Attorney David Fischer successfully convinced Judge Kara K. Ueda in his motion to suppress the search and seizure because the stop itself for "illegal" tinted windows" was not legal and the subsequent search was not lawful because of the illegal stop and because the "pat search" was not lawful. In this case, the Suffolk County Police Department applied for and obtained a warrant to search the "person of" defendant and "the entire premises located at" an address believed to be defendant's residence, "a 1 story ranch style house." To address the continued viability of caselaw premised upon our interpretation of both the U.S. and the State Constitutions, we now clarify thatat the very leastthose cases accurately set forth our state constitutional law. G.R. Wilson, J. BOGGS, Justice. G.R. No other contraband was found on Mr. Gordon's person or in the interior of the residence. By Alan Feuer,Maggie Haberman and Ben Protess. The issue in Hansen was whether there was probable cause for the search warrant directed at "two separate target locations discretely described," namely a residence and an "automotive van wherever located" (id. However, Siegal struck back with a letter to Judge Feuerstein regarding the prosecutor's intentions to pursue criminal action against Drago: In its letter, the Government has asserted that, notwithstanding the suppression of theevidence, it intends to proceed with prosecuting John [Drago]. . Our Court has never adopted a "fixed analytical formula for determining when the proper protection of fundamental rights requires resort to the State Constitution" (Scott, 79 NY2d at 491). Warrants "interpose the detached and independent judgment of a neutral Magistrate between the interested viewpoint [*4]of those engaged in ferreting out crime and potential encroachments on the sanctity and privacy of the individual" (People v Hanlon, 36 NY2d 549, 558 [1975]). South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 367-368 [1976]; People v Galak, 81 NY2d 463, 467 [1993]). No. In another case of illegal search and seizure, three Chicago police officers and one Glenview police officer who were involved in an illegal search and seizure of a man's car were deemed guilty of perjury, obstructing justice, and official misconduct earlier this year when it was found that they had illegally searched the defendant's . Those federal courts extending Ross to automobiles on the theory that an automobile is no different than a paper bag have found difficulty in arriving at a single standard for determining what vehicles may be searched: they disagree regarding whether police officers may search any vehicle found onsite during the execution of a premises warrant or only those vehicles that are "owned or controlled by the owner of . As the Court made clear, the fact that the warrant in Sciacca "authorized the search of a particular van and nothing else" did not mean that "a vehicle may never be searched while on private property" (id. Moreover, a search of vehicles is reasonable insofar as defendant may have secreted the objects of the search, i.e., drugs and other evidence of trafficking, in his vehicles (id. Residents say the street crime unit was an intimidating and sometimes violent presence in the city. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. a premises) does not impliedly encompass the others. That Court did, however, leave no doubtat least in the view of any other court to consider the issuethat the Fourth Amendment permits the search of containers found on the premises, such as the vehicles here. . . His sole contention was that the search of the vehicles was outside the scope of the search permitted by the warrant, noting that the vehicles were not in an attached garage and thus not part of the home. . The converse is also true. THE STATE v. ROSENBAUM et al. Thus, to be valid, a search warrant must be "specific enough to leave no discretion to the executing officer" (People v Brown, 96 NY2d 80, 84 [2001], quoting People v Darling, 95 NY2d 530, 537 [2000]). As explained below, the constitutional principles we have developed in this area, including judicial monitoring of the search warrant process and the importance of probable cause and particularity, strongly weigh against the People's proposed rule. This Court upheld the validity of the search and seizure under Terry. The officers stopped the man, subjected him to a patdown search, and then inspected the interior of the vehicle for other weapons. 2019) Jun 10, 2020 133 Harv. It's a fact that check cashing businesses handle a lot of cash and with a lot of cash comes a lot of reporting. InJune 13, 2017, U.S. District Judge Alison Nathan delivered a blistering account ofthoseFBI raidsWey's attorney. The Appellate Division affirmed, concurring in Supreme Court's conclusion that "the search warrant did not particularize that a search of the vehicles was permitted" and "probable cause to search those vehicles had not been established in the application for the search warrant" (169 AD3d 714, 714-715 [2d Dept 2019] [internal citations omitted]). at 402 [the "ultimate mandate of reasonableness" "depend(s) upon the facts and circumstances"]). We explained: "The observations of the police were that this van had made 'trips in and out carrying at least one other person in addition to the driver', and that it was 'the sole vehicle observed entering and leaving these premises on a regular basis'. Likewise, the People attempt to distinguish People v Dumper by arguing that the salient difference in Dumper was that the vehicle was driven onto the property during the execution of the warrant. According to the Government, it willnow more than one year after seeking the indictment, more than six years after theexecution of the search, and almost eight years from beginning its investigation into Johnsbusiness ask the grand jury to issue yet another charge against John, by way of anostensible superseding indictment, and to expand on the description and scope of the conductcharged in the current indictment. Moreover, to the extent to which vehicle searches are authorized in a warrant, the vehicles must be "designated or described" (CPL 690.15 [1] [b]). You're all set! The factual materials prepared for the search warrant made no mention of any vehicles associated with Mr. Gordon or the premises as allegedly being involved in the observed criminal activity. Shield ruled on September 10 that the items seized from Drago's business shouldbe suppressed and that the agents' reliance on a warrant without aspecification of a crime was one of "recklessness.". Indeed, we observed in Dumper thatpursuant to both constitutional and statutory directivesa "warrant must describe the premises to be searched" and "this warrant did not include the automobile" (Dumper, 28 NY2d at 299). are unpreserved here because, in the suppression hearing, defendant did not argue that the State Constitution provides greater protections than its federal counterpart"][FN9]; People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339, 344, 345 n 4 [2003] [holding that the defendant failed to preserve "grounds to impose any heightened due process procedures" under the State Constitution, even though his due-process challenge below referenced both the State and Federal Constitutions]). Williams, 2019 U.S. App. Indeed, the observed pattern, as described in the affidavit, was for Mr. Gordon to proceed from the residence to the street and back, without detouring to any vehicles parked at the residence. In Hansen, the police surveilled the van in question, recorded its repeated travels to and from the residence, and specifically mentioned the vehicle in the warrant. The majority's response to the analysis of Ross conducted by all the federal circuit courts and other state courts that have considered the issue is to express "skeptic[ism]," with an added footnote that explains that the Supreme Court in Ross did not disturb the fundamental principle that searches must be bound by probable cause (majority op at 6 and n 1). Before the motion court, defendant argued that he was entitled to suppression because the search of the vehicles fell outside the scope of the warrant. In the context of Article 1, Section 12, we have done so when, among other considerations, "the aims of predictability and precision in judicial review of search and seizure cases . This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. The Court broadly stated that a "lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search" (Ross, 456 US at 820-821). The Constitution (NY Const, art I, 12; US Const, 4th Amdt) requires that a warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the Criminal Procedure Law provides for the issuance of warrants to search persons, premises or vehicles (CPL 690.15). You're all set! During execution of the warrant, the police searched two vehicles: (1) a Nissan Maxima parked on the driveway of the property and (2) an unregistered 2000 Chevrolet sedan parked in the backyard. The People rely heavily on United States v Ross (456 US 798 [1982]) and several decisions of Federal Courts of Appeals that have determined, under the U.S. Constitution, that a warrant to search an "entire premises" may, under certain circumstances, impliedly authorize a search of automobiles found on the property (e.g.